Empty Pockets: Application of the Fireman\u27s Rule to Emergency Medical Tehnicians by Ruscus, Stephen E.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 20 
1991 
Empty Pockets: Application of the Fireman's Rule to Emergency 
Medical Tehnicians 
Stephen E. Ruscus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen E. Ruscus, Empty Pockets: Application of the Fireman's Rule to Emergency Medical Tehnicians, 7 
J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 339 (1991). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol7/iss1/20 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
EMPTY POCKETS: APPLICATION OF THE
FIREMAN'S RULE TO EMERGENCY
MEDICAL TECHNICIANS'
Traumatic injuries-multiple fractures, crushed limbs, head injuries, blunt
or penetrating traumas, tissue bums, cardiopulmonary arrest-kill an esti-
mated 140,000 people each year. The annual cost of medical care services
and lost productivity, resulting from such injuries, exceeds $155 billion.2 In
the last fifteen years, a worthy adversary of trauma has arisen; Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) substantially reduces the incidence of trauma
death3 through an organized system of pre-hospital and hospital trauma
1. Emergency medical technicians (EMT's) are an essential link in the Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) chain. EMT's are trained to provide basic life support to trauma
victims, stabilizing and transporting them to appropriate facilities as swiftly and safely as
possible. For a statutory definition of both EMT's and another class of EMS personnel,
paramedics, see infra note 107.
2. Trauma Advisory Committee Issues Report and Recommendations, Bus. Wire, Jan.
4, 1990 (NEXIS, Bwire file). A complete trauma care system with full staff, modem equip-
ment and effective distribution of both trauma centers and ambulance units would reduce both
the number of deaths by 20% to 50%, and costs, correspondingly. See id.; see also Dodson,
Doctors Decry 'Neglected Epidemic' of Trauma Deaths, L.A. Times, May 31, 1985, § 2, at 1,
col. 4 (Orange County ed.).
3. McAuliffe, Medical Advances and Political Problems: Rx for Trauma Care, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 1986, at 53. Pre-hospital emergency care provided by EMT's
is a dynamic, emerging field whose newness belies its tremendous impact on the survival
chances of the sick and injured. See supra note 2. Although there are currently over 500,000
individuals classified as EMT's in EMS systems nationwide, Telephone interview with John
Carey, Executive Director of the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians
(Oct. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Carey], the field of pre-hospital medical care is, in its present form,
new to the United States. See Curry, Why Good Samaritan Laws Don't Work, 10 J. EMER-
GENCY MED. SERVICES 26, 26 (1985).
As late as the mid-1960's, pre-hospital emergency medical care was characterized by the
"'[w]e haul and that's all' philosophy of EMS." Id. Ambulance services operated by funeral
homes would load patients into the back of long, low ambulances built for speed, transport
them virtually unattended, and deposit them at the hospital or the morgue depending upon the
patient's condition on arrival. Telephone interview with James 0. Page, Publisher of the Jour-
nal of Emergency Medical Services (Oct. 1989); see also J. PAGE, THE PARAMEDICS 3 (1979);
Curry, supra, at 26. The current concept of Emergency Medical Services originated in the
mid-1960's, when the National Academy of Sciences National Research Council issued the
following statement intending to establish standards for pre-hospital care:
Ambulance personnel are responsible for all lay emergency care from the time they
first see the victim through the transportation and delivery to care of a physician.
They therefore must be able not only to appraise the extent of first aid rendered by
others, but also to carry out what additional measures will make it safe to move the
victim and minimize morbidity and mortality.
340 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 7:339
care, designed either to stabilize or to operate on a patient within the sixty-
minute "golden hour" following the trauma.4 When EMS reaches victims
within the golden hour, the emergency survival rate of these patients jumps
from twenty-five to eighty-five percent.5
Large cuts in government funding6 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in-
creasing amounts of medical malpractice litigation7 have critically hampered
the wholesale development of EMS systems in recent years.' Now, another
H. GRANT, R. MURRAY, JR. & J. BERGERON, EMERGENCY CARE 3 (1986) [hereinafter
GRANT]. Additional impetus for the current EMS system is found in the National Highway
Safety Act of 1966 which "charged the United States Department of Transportation... with
developing Emergency Medical Services (EMS) standards and assisting the states to upgrade
the quality of their pre-hospital emergency care." Id. Between 1969-1976, 25 states initiated
advanced, pre-hospital, nonphysician services, J. PAGE, supra, at 18, and 29 states statutorily
defined EMS personnel classifications. Id. at vii. The widespread proliferation of EMS sys-
tems, throughout not only large cities but also other urban areas, has only been observable
within the last 10 to 15 years. Glastris, An American Hero: Dr. David Boyd and Emergency
Health Care, 18 WASH. MONTHLY 19, 24 (1986).
4. Levy, Hahnemann's Helicopter Hops Raise Chances of Patient Survival to 85%, Fo-
cus, June 29, 1988, at 56; see also Glastris, supra note 3, at 19. Most trauma deaths are caused
by hemorrhagic shock. Severe hemorrhaging "triggers wild oscillations in the body's biochem-
istry," potentially causing multi-system organ failure. Id. at 21. Immediate stabilization and
rapid transport significantly reduce the chance of a patient going into shock. Id.
5. McAuliffe, supra note 3, at 53.
6. See Grossman, Emergency! Emergency: Trauma Care, HEALTH, July, 1989, at 76
("Despite its huge impact, injury is not on the public-health agenda of the United States...
[and] receives scant public funding."); see also EMT, Volunteer Firefighter Crisis Predicted,
U.P.I., Aug. 10, 1989 (NEXIS, Wires file) ("[Flirefighting and medical services ... are also
facing financial difficulties because the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
demands they constantly update equipment."). In 1981, substantial cuts were made in federal
EMS allocations, exacerbating pre-existing systemic difficulties. Glastris, supra note 3, at 27
(funding over a two-year period dropped 34%).
7. Curry, supra note 3, at 26. Because, however, the service provided by EMS personnel
benefits whole communities, virtually all states have now enacted some immunity-from-suit
provision, commonly known as a "good samaritan" statute, which acts as a defense for EMS
personnel in malpractice litigation. Id.; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-135 (1985) ("No act or
omission of any [ambulance paramedic] . . . done or omitted in good faith while rendering
emergency care services... shall impose any liability upon [the ambulance paramedic] .... ").
While large numbers of medical malpractice suits continue to concern EMS personnel, this
Comment focuses on suits filed by EMS personnel against negligent actors and not malpractice
suits filed by patients against EMS personnel.
8. "American ambulance service is in such a state of emergency that some cities should
set red lights flashing and sirens wailing.... [The condition of EMS] 'for certainly more than
half the United States ... ranges from deep trouble to critical but stable .... ' " Dvorchak,
Ambulance Service Across the U.S. is in Critical Condition, Experts Say, L.A. Times, May 1,
1988, § 1, at 4, col. 1 (quoting Jack Stout, Miami consultant/designer of ambulance systems).
Yet, EMS services are absolutely critical to the preservation of lives that would, without such
services, be lost on account of injury. At least 73% of all deaths from motor vehicle accidents
in which the death does not result from brain injury can be prevented by prompt emergency
medical attention. Grossman, supra note 6, at 76. "Clearly, the lack of a system is killing
people." Id.
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legal problem threatens to inhibit EMS development: barring tort recovery
by EMS members for injuries they suffer risking their lives in the rescue.
Recently, two state courts have considered extending the common law fire-
man's rule to EMS personnel. In jurisdictions where this extension might be
accepted, the rule, which in its most limited form prohibits a fireman from
recovering for injuries caused by the very negligence necessitating his pres-
ence, would deny recovery by EMS personnel for many of the injuries suf-
fered in the course of their employment.9 Should the rule be applied to EMS
personnel, many of those who have been negligently injured in the perform-
ance of their duties will lose the right to recover from the negligent actors
causing their injuries.10
In Kowalski v. Gratopp," Michigan became the first state to consider ex-
tending the fireman's rule to EMS personnel. In that case, the plaintiff, a
paramedic, slipped on an icy walkway at the scene of a call and filed suit
alleging negligent maintenance of the premises. 2 The Michigan Court of
Appeals decided against extension of the rule and, consequently, held that
the fireman's rule did not bar recovery of damages by the paramedic. 3 In
obiter dictum, the court further stated that the fireman's rule should not be
applied to any subcategory of EMS professionals. 4
In contrast, the New Jersey Superior Court, in Siligato v. Hiles,'5 included
EMS personnel in the category of public officials to whom the rule applies
and barred recovery by emergency medical technician Stephen Siligato."6
Siligato had sued his baby sitter for negligent infliction of emotional distress
after being forced to witness the death of his infant son in the course of an
emergency, call. 7
Neither the Michigan Court of Appeals nor the New Jersey Superior
Court carefully examined the common law and policy considerations under-
lying the fireman's rule, and neither court studied the differences between
firemen and EMS personnel in their respective roles and training. Given the
budgetary problems currently facing EMS, the increasing amounts of mal-
practice litigation, and the loss of volunteer emergency medical technicians
9. For a recitation of the common law fireman's rule see Lipson v. Superior Court, 31
Cal. 3d 362, 366, 644 P.2d 822, 825, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632 (1982).
10. But see Kowalski v. Gratopp, 177 Mich. App. 448, 451, 442 N.W.2d 682, 683 (1989)
(fireman's rule not applied and recovery therefore permissible by paramedic).
11. 177 Mich. App. 448, 442 N.W.2d 682 (1989).
12. Id. at 449, 442 N.W.2d at 683.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 451, 442 N.W.2d at 683.
15. 236 N.J. Super. 64, 563 A.2d 1172 (Law Div. 1989).
16. Id. at 67, 563 A.2d at 1173.
17. Id.
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(EMT's),18 who comprise an essential link in the trauma care chain, no
course affecting EMS should be adopted without careful deliberation on the
application of prior law to the unique characteristics of rapidly evolving
EMS systems.
This Comment explores the multiple rationales for the fireman's rule. It
then advances and analyzes the issues which should be considered before
extending the fireman's rule to EMS personnel. 9 Specifically, this Comment
considers: Whether the common law rescue doctrine supersedes the fire-
man's rule; whether EMT's must be hired specifically to confront hazardous
situations before the fireman's rule will be extended to them; whether volun-
teer EMS personnel fall within the fireman's rule; whether the duty of all
potentially negligent members of the public to EMS personnel is excused
when EMS personnel agree, between themselves and their employer, to as-
sume the risks incident to their employment; whether traditional premises
liability categorizations support an extension of the fireman's rule to EMS
personnel; and whether public policy reasons for the fireman's rule support
such an extension. This Comment then examines the limited decisions of the
two state courts which have considered the duty owed EMT's and their
paramedic counterparts.2" Finally, this Comment concludes that while the
fireman's rule should be extended to EMS personnel because public policy
rationales apply equally to both firemen and EMS personnel, legislative re-
form of EMS benefit statutes (such as workmen's compensation statutes) is
necessary to reflect and preserve the evolving role of EMS in contemporary
society.
I. THE ORIGINS AND RATIONALE OF THE FIREMAN'S RULE
The fireman's rule prohibits a fireman from recovering damages for inju-
ries caused by the very negligence that created the risk necessitating his pres-
ence.2 Almost all jurisdictions have adopted some form of the fireman's
rule.22 The rule also applies to policemen, 23 and thus, is frequently referred
18. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 76.
19. The purpose of this Comment is not to argue for or against the existence of a fireman's
rule per se, but to examine whether the reasons advanced to justify the fireman's rule may
similarly be used to justify extension of the rule to EMS personnel.
20. Statutes distinguish the paramedic class of EMS personnel from the EMT class by the
additional training of the former and the relative sophistication of the life support procedures
that paramedics can perform. See, e.g., infra note 107.
21. Lipson v. Superior Court. 31 Cal. 3d 362, 366, 644 P.2d 822, 825, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629,
632 (1982).
22. Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 572, 694 P.2d 433, 436 (1985). Only
Texas, Pennsylvania, Washington, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and New York have chosen not to adopt some form of a fireman's rule. Note, Oregon Abol-
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to as the professional rescuer's rule.2 4 The treatment of the rule, not as a
fireman's rule, but as a professional rescuer's rule, when coupled with the
historical association of EMS with fire departments, 25 virtually assures that
defendants will attempt to bring EMS personnel within the scope of the fire-
man's rule. This Comment is intended to review and resolve the issues
which this wave of first-impression litigation will present in jurisdictions
across the country.
In its earliest formulation, the fireman's rule was based upon traditional
premises liability; firemen were classified as either licensees or invitees. 26 Be-
cause this rigid classification of firemen has proven awkward and unsatisfac-
tory,2 7 most courts have shifted the derivation of the rule either to
ishes the Fireman's Rule-Christiansen v. Murphy, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 957, 966-67 nn.58-
59 (1985).
23. Flowers v. Sting Sec., Inc., 62 Md. App. 116, 123 n.l, 488 A.2d 523, 527 n.l, aff'd,
308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
24. See, e.g., Bonney v. Canadian Nat'l R.R., 613 F. Supp. 997, 1008 (D. Me. 1985), rev'd,
800 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1986); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So. 2d 487, 491 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 514 So. 2d 457 (La. 1987); Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash. 2d 975, 978, 530
P.2d 254, 257 (1975); W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 61 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER]. The court in Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., included firemen, policemen,
and other professionals in its statement of persons covered by the fireman's rule. 207 Cal. App.
3d 1467, 1478, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755, 761 (1989).
25. Even today, between 70%-80% of all EMS personnel are also part of a fire service.
Carey, supra note 3.
26. See, e.g., Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 190, 32 N.E. 182, 184 (1892); Meiers v. Fred
Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 15-16, 127 N.E. 491, 492-93 (1920).
27. Note, Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 749,
752 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Assumption of the Risk]. Firemen have never fit cleanly into
either the licensee or the invitee category. Id. "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter
or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 330 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. An invitee is defined as either a public invi-
tee or a business visitor. "A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land
as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public." Id. at
§ 332(2). "A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land."
Id. at § 332(3).
To a licensee, the landowner merely owes a duty to warn of any concealed, dangerous condi-
tions that are known to the landowner but not reasonably discoverable to the licensee. Frankel
v. Kurtz, 239 F. Supp. 713, 717 (W.D.S.C. 1965); PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 60; see also
RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 342. But to the invitee, an owner has an affirmative duty to make a
reasonable inspection of the premises and to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condi-
tion when he realizes that the premises present an unreasonable risk of harm and expects that
an invitee will not discover this danger for himself. Id. at § 343; Anderson v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc., 257 S.C. 75, 77, 184 S.E.2d 77, 77 (1971); see also PROSSER, supra note 24, at
§61.
The law concerning proper classification of firefighters is hopelessly conflicting. Compare
Price v. Morgan, 436 So. 2d 1116, 1120-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding firemen licen-
sees) and Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 688, 279 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1979)
(holding firemen bare licensees) with Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 328
1991]
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assumption of the risk or have supplied public policy justifications for its
adoption.28
Where the fireman's rule is grounded in primary assumption of the risk,29
N.E.2d 538, 541 (1975) (holding firemen licensees at some times and invitees at others) and
Walsh v. Madison Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J. Super. 134, 139, 245 A.2d 512, 515 (1968)
(categorization of firemen depends not on title but on type of work done by firemen on prem-
ises). The confusing treatment of firemen under traditional premises liability analysis exists
largely because firemen require neither the consent nor invitation of the landowner to enter
upon the land. See RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 345 comment c; I F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.16 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter HARPER]; see, e.g., Brady v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 350 Ohio St. 3d 161, 163, 519 N.E.2d 387, 388 (1988). Nonetheless,
firemen are generally owed the same duty that is owed a licensee. While it is "foolish to say
that a fireman who comes to extinguish a blaze . . . confers no pecuniary benefit upon the
occupier[, such a benefit tending to classify a fireman as an invitee], firemen and policemen,
like licensees, are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of the premises."
PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 61. In such circumstances, a landowner or occupier may not
reasonably be expected to prepare his premises. Id.; see also Shypulsky v. Waldorf Paper Prod.
Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1951). For a thorough examination of the duty
owed to policemen and firemen under a traditional premises liability analysis, see generally
Note, Assumption of the Risk, supra.
28. Note, Assumption of the Risk, supra note 27, at 746, 747; see, e.g., Lipson v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 370, 644 P.2d 822, 827, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 634 (1982); Pottebaum v.
Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa 1984); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349-50
(Minn. 1979); Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 38 (R.I. 1989).
The classification of firemen as invitees or licensees is a strained and artificial one, and, by
definition, addresses only the duty owed a firemen on property owned or occupied by another.
See supra note 27. Bases in assumption of risk and public policy are therefore necessary when
courts extend the rule, as they have in many jurisdictions, to preclude recovery for a fireman's
injuries occurring on premises other than those of the negligent landowner or occupier. See,
e.g., Whitten v. Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Auth., 357 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1978); Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 572-
76, 694 P.2d 433, 436-38 (1985); Flowers v. Sting Sec., Inc., 62 Md. App. 116, 133-34, 488
A.2d 523, 532, aff'd, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
29. The term assumption of risk in its primary sense refers to risks that are incidental
to a relationship of free association between plaintiff and defendant .... In such a
case defendant's duty toward plaintiff is [traditionally thought to be] limited ....
[The duty] does not extend to the use of care to make the conditions of the relation-
ship reasonably safe-at most the duty is one of care to make these conditions as safe
as they appear to be ....
HARPER, supra note 27, at 1163.
[P]rimary assumption of the risk technically is not a defense, but rather a legal theory
which relieves a defendant of a duty which he might otherwise owe to the plaintiff
.... Secondary assumption of the risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily en-
counters a known, appreciated risk (imposed by another's negligence] without an at-
tendant manifestation by the plaintiff that he consents to relieve the defendant of his
duty.
Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Minn. 1979) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted); see also Baker v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 710, 719, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311, 317
(1982).
The advent of comparative negligence statutes in many jurisdictions across the country
should not destroy the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App.
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it is said to be based "on a principle as fundamental to our law today as it
was centuries ago. The principle is not unique to landowner cases but is
applicable to our entire system of justice--one who has knowingly and vol-
untarily confronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained
thereby."3 ° In accepting salary and fringe benefits, firemen and policemen
are said to assume, as a matter of law, all normal risks inherent to employ-
ment and may not recover from one who negligently creates such a risk.3 '
Where states have adopted the fireman's rule for reasons of public pol-
icy,32 several justifications have been advanced to support the doctrine.
First, the rule may acknowledge that it is offensive for a firefighter, paid and
trained at the public's expense to confront crises often created by negligent
citizens, to recover for the negligence that creates the very need for his em-
ployment.33 Further, the rule may reflect the inconsistency and unfairness
of exposing a citizen to the risk of tort liability when the citizen has neither
the right to exclude nor control public safety officers in an emergency situa-
tion.34 The fireman's rule also recognizes that the taxpayer, who pays the
fire and police departments to confront risks that may be occasioned by his
own future acts of negligence, does not expect to pay again when the public
servant is injured while exposed to those risks.3" Finally, public policy may
justify the fireman's rule on the grounds that, despite the widespread exist-
ence of liability insurance, a legislature may more effectively and fairly
spread the risk of injury to a professional rescuer by passing the cost onto
the public through government entities that employ firefighters and police
officers.36
3d 1606, 1627, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 878 (1990); Kreski v. Modem Wholesale Elec. Supply Co.,
429 Mich. 347, 363, 415 N.W.2d 178, 185 (1987); Armstrong, 284 N.W.2d at 351. While
secondary assumption of risk is a form of contributory negligence and, therefore, is no longer a
viable defense in comparative negligence jurisdictions, see Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1609, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 871, primary assumption of risk releases the defendant's duty such that he will
not be found negligent and will, consequently, require no defense whatsoever. Armstrong, 284
N.W.2d at 351.
30. Armstrong, 284 N.W.2d at 349-50 (quoting Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 203, 571
P.2d 609, 611, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 154 (1977)).
31. Steelman v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425, 427, 634 P.2d 666, 667 (1981).
32. See, e.g., Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 642 (Iowa 1984); Mignone v. Field-
crest, 556 A.2d 35, 39 (R.I. 1989).
33. Mignone, 556 A.2d at 39.
34. Pottebaum, 347 N.W.2d at 645.
35. Cella v. Interstate Properties, 232 N.J. Super. 232, 237, 556 A.2d 1262, 1264 (App.
Div. 1989) (quoting Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983)).
36. Pottebaum, 347 N.W.2d at 645-46.
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II. A BLUEPRINT FOR THE CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
Several courts have stated that the above bases for the fireman's rule form
"a cluster of loosely related reasons, no one of which is necessarily sufficient
to explain the rule [applied to firemen] in all of its manifestations., 37 Thus,
courts have argued that the premises liability theory should not be separated
from the assumption of the risk theory; nor, the assumption of the risk the-
ory, from the public policy rationales.38 It has been suggested that when
examining the bases for the rule, a court need not scrutinize the limitations
of the individual legal theories.39 This Comment, however, contemplates
extension of the fireman's rule to EMT's. Since there is no developed history
of such an extension, each legal basis for the rule must be tested anew with
an eye to the differences in function, training, and level of compensation
between firemen (and policemen) and EMS personnel.
A. Extension in Jurisdictions Grounding the Fireman's Rule in Primary
Assumption of the Risk
1. Rescuing the Fireman's Rule from the Rescue Doctrine
In jurisdictions seeking to extend a fireman's rule based upon primary as-
sumption of the risk, the potentially conflicting application of the common
law rescue doctrine must be considered.' This doctrine finds one expression
in the words of Justice Cardozo who said, "Danger invites rescue. The cry
of distress is the summons to relief."'" Because this relief is a foreseeable
consequence of any situation necessitating rescue, the "wrong [(breach of
duty)] to the imperilled victim... is a wrong also to his rescuer."42 Eckert
37. Flowers v. Sting Sec., Inc., 62 Md. App. 116, 123-24, 448 A.2d 523, 527 (fireman's
rule barred recovery to a volunteer fireman who, in the course of fighting a fire, fell twelve
stories down an open elevator shaft), aff'd, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
38. Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 205, 571 P.2d 609, 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155
(1977).
39. Id.
40. See Walker Hauling Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 624, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499
(1964); Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 688, 279 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1979);
Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash. 2d 975, 978, 530 P.2d 254, 257 (1975). The rescue doctrine has
been stated as follows:
Where a defendant's negligent act ... has created a condition or situation which
involves urgent and imminent peril and danger, to life or property, of himself or of
others, those acts of negligence are also negligence in relationship to all others who,
in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety under the circumstances, short of
rashness and recklessness, may attempt ... to rescue such endangered life or prop-
erty ....
Walker Hauling, 110 Ga. App. at 624, 139 S.E.2d at 499.
41. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 437 (1921).
42. Id.
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v. Long Island R.R.,4 long considered the leading case on the rescue doc-
trine,' formulated the rescue doctrine somewhat differently:
Under the circumstances in which the deceased was placed, it was
not wrongful in him to make every effort in his power to rescue the
child .... It was his duty to exercise his judgment as to whether
he could probably save the child without serious injury to himself.
If from the appearances he believed that he could, it was not negli-
gence to make an attempt so to do, although believing that possibly
he might fail and receive an injury himself.4"
In order to understand a court's efforts to apply a fireman's rule based on
primary assumption of the risk, where plaintiff rescuer is a member of EMS,
it is critical to distinguish between the above expressions of the rescue doc-
trine. Under Justice Cardozo's statement of the rule, the tortfeasor has an
affirmative duty to the rescuer; under the Eckert court's statement of the
rule, protection to the rescuer should occur because, whether a duty to the
rescuer exists, the tortfeasor is unable to argue contributory negligence on
the part of the rescuer. Where a member of EMS is injured in the perform-
ance of his duties, a court following the Cardozo rule would not permit a
fireman's i'ule based on primary assumption of the risk to bar recovery by
the EMS member; "the doctrine of rescue necessarily contemplates an as-
sumption of the risk inherent in the peril ... and [yet] allows recovery for
injuries thereby incurred, for the reason that the defendants were charged
with the foreseeability of their negligence's [sic] attracting rescuers to as-
sume the risks."4 6
A court following the Eckert rule, however, would permit the application
of a fireman's rule based on primary assumption of the risk. Although,
under the Eckert statement of the rescue doctrine, the tortfeasor would not
be permitted to argue contributory negligence, the Eckert formulation does
not create the superseding duty towards the rescuer found in the Cardozo
rule; the fireman's rule would still negate any duty owed by the tortfeasor to
protect the rescuer from harm foreseeably within the scope of his employ-
ment.47 Thus, the court would never reach the question of whether a con-
43. 43 N.Y. 502 (1870).
44. See Henshaw v. Belyea, 220 Cal. 458, 459, 31 P.2d 348, 349 (1934) (rescue doctrine
grew out of cases like Eckert, "said to be the leading case allowing a recovery by the rescuer").
45. Eckert, 43 N.Y. at 505-06.
46. Walker Hauling Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 625, 139 S.E.2d 496, 500
(1964).
47. The rescue doctrine, as stated in Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 684,
279 N.W.2d 855, 855 (1979) and Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash. 2d 975, 977, 530 P.2d 254, 256
(1975), contemplates a response to imminent "peril, or reasonable appearance of peril, to the
life or limb of another ... in the sense that an emergency exists requiring immediate action."
Maltman, 84 Wash. 2d at 977, 530 P.2d at 256. Thus, even if the rescue doctrine were to
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tributory negligence defense existed.4"
The preferred position is that the rescue doctrine does not create a duty to
the rescuer but merely serves to prohibit the affirmative defense of contribu-
tory negligence. This preference may be proven deductively: the Cardozo
formulation of the rescue doctrine creates a duty to the rescuer which sur-
vives the fireman's rule; volunteer firemen, as professional rescuers who
might otherwise receive the benefits of this duty and recover under the res-
cue doctrine (covering voluntary acts) are almost always held subject to the
fireman's rule and barred from recovery when this rule is based upon the
notion of assumption of the risk;4 9 therefore, not the Cardozo but the Eckert
formulation of the rescue doctrine must be the prevalent one. Where the
preferred formulation is employed in jurisdictions grounding the fireman's
rule in primary assumption of the risk, the rescue doctrine will not prevent
extension of the fireman's rule to EMS personnel.
2. Does Extension Require a Duty to Confront?
Even if the rescue doctrine will not prevent extension of the fireman's rule
preempt the fireman's rule in situations involving EMS personnel, application of the rescue
doctrine would be limited to situations requiring emergency medical care and would not cover
EMS response to the host of calls requiring non-emergency medical care, where an EMT
might be injured.
48. See, e.g., Maltman, 84 Wash. 2d at 978-79, 530 P.2d at 257. The court in Maltman
stated that, to apply the rescue doctrine, "[t]here must [first] be negligence on the part of the
defendant which is the proximate cause of [the] peril." Id. at 977, 530 P.2d at 256. But "[i]n
the case of a professional rescuer[,] certain hazards are assumed . . ... When the injury is the
result of a hazard generally recognized as being within the scope of dangers identified with the
particular rescue operation, the doctrine will be unavailable to that plaintiff." Id. at 978-79,
530 P.2d at 257; see also Buchanan, 203 Neb. at 688, 279 N.W.2d at 859.
49. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 461 n.43. Not surprisingly, the rescue doctrine has
been almost universally limited to instances in which "the rescuer acts from motives of altru-
ism." Carter v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 341 F. Supp. 628, 630 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd,
470 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1973). Permitting paid public rescuers to be paid again, through the
liability of the tortfeasor for injuries sustained in the line of duty, has often been said to offend
public policy. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. The court in Walker Hauling
Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 100 Ga. App. 620, 139 S.E.2d 496 (1964), however, arguing for the
application of the rescue doctrine to volunteer firemen, commented that to exclude trained,
volunteer rescuers would be to "reduce the ranks of rescuers ... to the less competent." Id. at
624, 139 S.E.2d at 499. This, said the court, would "contradict and weaken the application
and consequences of one of the most advanced doctrines evolved by the conscience of man-
kind." Id.
Walker Hauling is the leading minority case advocating the Cardozo statement of the rescue
doctrine. Maltman v. Sauer, however, is the first case to integrate the rescue doctrine with the
somewhat antithetical fireman's rule. 84 Wash. 2d 975, 978, 530 P.2d 254, 257 (1975) ("We
believe that a professional rescuer, in making a deliberate attempt at saving a life, and under
the correct factual setting [(facing hazards not foreseeably identified with the particular rescue
operation)], is within the intended scope of the 'rescue doctrine.' ").
I
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to EMS personnel, in jurisdictions grounding the adoption of the fireman's
rule in primary assumption of the risk, courts must address a second issue in
order to determine how widely the doctrine might be applied to EMS per-
sonnel. Courts have been willing to apply the fireman's rule to both police-
men and firemen because they are public employees who are hired, trained,
and paid to confront danger."0 EMS personnel, on the other hand, are paid
to provide emergency medical services and face danger only incidentally.
EMS personnel are not specifically paid to combat dangerous situations for
the protection of society and should perhaps be treated differently under the
primary assumption of risk analysis.
Under the assumption of risk analysis, persons fall within the scope of the
fireman's rule because they confront known peril with full realization of the
risks.5" Two lines of cases imply differing interpretations of the framework
within which EMT's will be said to confront known peril. The first holds
that the known, "ordinary risks which a fireman encounters in the perform-
ance of his duty .. , he has assumed a duty to perform."5 2 The contrasting
line of cases indicates that firemen cannot complain of the negligence caus-
ing a fire where their "occupation by its very nature exposes them to particu-
lar risks of harm.'" 3 Where firemen are concerned, the two statements of
the risk assumption are largely equivalent; where EMT's are concerned,
however, the difference between the statements is vast. Under the first for-
mulation, the fireman's rule would bar recovery by an EMT injured by a
particular hazard only where the EMT had a duty to confront that danger.
Thus, the rule would only bar recovery by an EMT who suffered from
smoke inhalation if he had a duty to expose himself to smoke in order to
render emergency care. By the second formulation, an EMT would find his
recovery barred where the hazard was one to which a reasonable EMT could
expect exposure in the course of his employment. Because a reasonable
EMT could expect to encounter smoke, for example, at the scene of any
large building fire, under the second formulation, the fireman's rule would
almost certainly bar recovery for smoke inhalation.
The difference between the first and second formulations of the "con-
fronting known perils" rationale is crucial to the determination of how
50. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Gratopp, 177 Mich. App. 448, 450, 682 N.W.2d 682, 683
(1989).
51. Moreno v. Mars, 102 N.M. 373, 377, 695 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Ct. App. 1984) (fireman
sued the Marrs Mudd Company after exposure to para-formaldehyde fumes while evacuating
children from a school adjacent to the scene of a chemical leak).
52. Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 690, 279 N.W.2d 855, 859 (1979)
(emphasis supplied).
53. Kocan v. Garino, 107 Cal. App. 3d 291, 293, 165 Cal. Rptr. 712, 713 (1980) (citing
Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977)).
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widely the fireman's rule might be applied to EMT's if courts permitted
some extension of the rule to EMS personnel. EMT's expect to encounter all
manner of hazards as they provide emergency medical attention to trauma
patients. Yet, many of the hazards to which they are exposed while render-
ing emergency medical care are not necessarily hazards which they have a
duty to face.54 The common law insists only that the duty of the EMT is to
act reasonably under the circumstances, and there are no statutory duties,
express or implied, compelling an EMT to risk his life in the line of duty."
Thus, if the rule required the existence of a duty to confront a specific haz-
ard, the possible applications of an extended fireman's rule would be very
limited indeed.
Most courts appear to accept the second formulation, finding primary as-
sumption of risk where the plaintiff "voluntarily enters into some relation
with the defendant, [appreciating certain risks,] with [the] knowledge that
the defendant will not protect him against one or more [of these] future risks
that may arise from the relation. ' , 56 In other words, primary assumption of
the risk will bar the recovery of an EMS member where he knows he might
encounter a particular hazard in the course of the job, even if he has no per
se duty to confront this hazard in the fulfillment of his official duties.
Maltman v. Sauer" illustrates this result. In that case, the estate of a
helicopter rescue crew member killed in a crash attempted to recover under
the rescue doctrine.5" The plaintiff was barred from recovery because the
hazard which caused him harm was "inherently within the ambit of those
dangers unique to and generally associated with this particular rescue opera-
54. Frew, Must EMT's Risk Their Lives?, 5 EMT J. 208, 209 (1981) ("The EMT-P's
[(paramedic's)] duty is to act reasonably under the circumstances."); see also S. FREW, STREET
LAW 180-91 (1983).
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 401.23(8) (West 1975). See generally Gargan, Trench
Rescue, 12 J. EMERGENCY MED. SERvIcEs, Nov. 1987, at 29. Jim Gargan, the training class
coordinator for Rescue Training Associates, Ltd., states that the first priority in any rescue
situation for an EMT is the rescuer himself. Id. The victim is the last priority, and somewhere
in between fall the duties owed to fellow workers, the EMS organization, and taxpayers in the
community. Id.; see also GRANT, supra note 3 (while addressing all aspects of EMT training
as defined by the United States Department of Transportation, Grant repeats catechistically
the notion that an EMT must only do what he is trained to do). Training standards carefully
described by state statute invariably insist only upon EMT training in a variety of basic life-
support techniques and never specify training in the management of specific hazards. See infra
note 107. It is obvious, however, upon an examination of the EMT training manual, that
EMT's regularly face a wide variety of hazards equally as dangerous as those faced by firefight-
ers. See GRANT, supra note 3, at 417, 499, 559, 562, 573 (detailing responses to fire hazards,
electrical hazards, vehicle fire hazards, vehicle and building entry hazards, and hazardous
chemical spills).
56. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 481.
57. 84 Wash. 2d 975, 530 P.2d 254 (1975).
58. Id. at 976, 530 P.2d at 255.
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tion." 9 Significantly, regardless of the extent to which the decedent was
trained or paid to confront these known hazards, the court focused on the
foreseeability of the dangers, stating that "these hazards are not hidden, un-
known, and extra hazardous dangers which would not be reasonably antici-
pated or foreseen by [the] decedent professional rescuer[]."' The Maltman
focus is not on the type of dangers one is hired and trained to combat, but
instead centers on the degree to which a plaintiff is aware that employment
means exposure to certain hazards.
In California, this interpretation of the fireman's rule, requiring foresee-
ability and consent but not a duty to confront, is even more pronounced.
California common law requires that firemen and EMS personnel knowingly
and voluntarily agree to confront a hazard before they may be said to have
primarily assumed the risk.6 Two recent cases, however, clarify the mean-
ing of the "confront a hazard" language. While both cases involve non-
public servants, classification as a public servant (e.g., a fireman) or a non-
public servant has never been said to affect the determination of primary
assumption of risk. The first is Von Beltz v. Stunt Man, Inc.62 In that case,
stuntwoman Von Beltz, who was paralyzed while filming a car chase for the
movie Cannonball Run, sought recovery for negligent stunt design.63 The
court held that "firemen, policemen, and other professionals, such as veteri-
narians, who engage in hazardous activities in the normal course of their
duties, have assumed the risk of known dangers and are thereby barred from
recovering for injury."' This language emphasizes that assumption of the
risk, and hence application of the fireman's rule, depends not on a duty to
confront the offending hazard, but rather on the plaintiff's knowledge of
hazards that he may encounter incident to his employment.
The reference to veterinarians in Von Beltz is to Nelson v. Hall,65 the sec-
ond case clarifying the "confront a hazard" language. In Nelson, a vet-
erinarian's assistant was bitten by a dog being treated in the course of her
duties.66 Because dog bites are an occupational hazard, and because the
plaintiff was aware of, and voluntarily encountered, this hazard, she was said
59. Id. at 979, 530 P.2d at 258.
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
61. Waiters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 204, 571 P.2d 609, 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155
(1977) (police officer sued homeowners for negligently providing alcohol to a minor who subse-
quently injured the officer when officer tried to apprehend youth for public drunkenness).
62. 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1989).
63. Id. at 1469-70, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
64. Id. at 1478, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (emphasis supplied).
65. 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1985).
66. Id. at 711, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
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to have assumed the risk in a primary sense.6 7 The position of a veterinarian
in relation to the particular hazards involved in the treatment of animals
largely parallels that of EMS personnel in performance of their sometimes
hazardous duties. A veterinarian has neither a duty to protect the public
from dog bites per se nor a duty to confront a ferocious dog; rather, a vet-
erinarian treats injured animals. The risk of being bitten is only incidental to
the duty of the veterinarian. In the same manner, the risks faced by EMS
personnel are also incidental to their primary duty, which is the treatment of
sick and injured people. Even with no duty to protect the public from the
particular injuries an EMT might suffer on the job, an EMT still assumes the
risk of such injuries because he knows, when he becomes an EMT, that risk
of injury is incidental to the duties performed.
The assumption of risk case which best addresses the factual peculiarities
of the EMS situation is Carter v. Taylor Diving and Salvage Co. 68 This case
illustrates the manner in which the primary assumption of risk doctrine may
bar recovery by EMS personnel. In Carter, a physician was hired to perform
emergency surgery in a decompression chamber under the surface of the
ocean. When the physician sustained a heart attack as a result of the partic-
ular stresses related to this surgery, he sued, claiming that the negligence
occasioning the need for his services was negligence for which he, himself,.
could recover.69 The court, in denying recovery as a matter of law,7° held
that Carter's
health was well known to him when he accepted employment ....
He knew or should have known.., that the travel to and from
offshore assignments, the long hours involved, and the tension in-
evitable in the circumstances would put a strain on his weak heart.
This indicates that, in the literal sense, Dr. Carter knew, and as-
sumed, the risk of what happened to him in the course of his pro-
fessional efforts.71
Carter lacks the complexity of other fireman's (professional rescuer's) rule
cases in that Carter was not injured by a hazard he was duty-bound to con-
front on behalf of society. There is, therefore, no question that the particular
role of firemen and policemen in society plays no part in the application of
the fireman's rule to him. Carter's suit is barred because, regardless of his
status as a non-public servant, Carter was aware of the potential hazards of
67. Id. at 715, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
68. 341 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. Id. at 629-31.
70. Id. at 632.
71. Id. at 631 (footnote omitted).
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the job and voluntarily entered a relationship in which he risked exposure to
these hazards.
The above case law indicates that an EMS member may be said to have
assumed the risk of certain hazards even where the confrontation of these
hazards, for which EMS personnel are not specifically trained, hired, or
paid, may be beyond the scope of the duty of the EMS member. An exami-
nation of the EMT training manual makes it perfectly clear that the pre-
scribed duties of an EMT are not necessarily the full measure of his service
to the public and that danger on the job is commonplace.72 Although EMS
personnel are not hired, trained, and paid to confront and protect the public
from danger, this should not prevent extension of a fireman's rule based
upon primary assumption of the risk to EMS personnel.
3. The Volunteer Army: Relationship Confirmed by the Doctrine of
Abandonment
Today, the overwhelming majority of firemen and EMS personnel are vol-
unteers.7 3 Courts must consider separately whether a fireman's rule based
upon primary assumption of risk may be applied to these volunteers. It is
clear that an EMT may assume the risk in the secondary sense, that is, have
knowledge of a particular, dangerous situation and voluntarily expose him-
self to that hazard. But to what extent does an EMT agree to primarily
assume the risk of all ordinary hazards arising out of his occupation? The
preceding section of this Comment answers this question generally, conclud-
ing that no duty to confront particular hazards need exist before one may be
said to have primarily assumed the risk;74 in order to primarily assume the
risk, a plaintiff EMT need only appreciate the risk and participate in a volun-
tary relationship with the potential tortfeasor that encompasses exposure to
these risks. Ordinarily, the employment contract and the receipt of salary
and benefits by the EMT, in exchange for his services, attest to this accept-
ance where paid, non-volunteer EMT's are concerned.
If, however, the fireman's rule based upon assumption of risk is to be ex-
tended to volunteer EMT's, for whom there is no contract, no salary, and
severely limited benefits, primary assumption of risk must be expressed
through other indicators. While the standardized training of EMS personnel
ensures appreciation of the normal risks involved in EMS work, it is not as
easy to establish the voluntary relationship with the potential tortfeasor nec-
72. See generally GRANT, supra note 3 (EMT's frequently take additional measures, nec-
essary under the circumstances, to move the victim and increase survival odds).
73. Carey, supra note 3 (90% of all firemen and between two-thirds and three-quarters of
all EMS personnel are currently volunteers).
74. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
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essary to establish primary assumption of risk. The common law of aban-
donment creates a duty, on the part of volunteer EMS personnel, to the
public, from which the requisite relationship with the potential tortfeasor
may be deduced. Principles of abandonment establish the common law duty
of one who previously has had no duty but undertakes assistance to an-
other.75 Such a person breaches a duty to a rescuee if, after undertaking
assistance, he then abandons his charge where such abandonment might
leave the other in a worse position than before.76 Courts have rationalized
the extension of the fireman's rule to volunteers by stating that volunteers,
"although uncompensated, undertake [by joining a firefighting organization]
the same duties as paid firemen."' 77 Since it is "beyond peradventure that the
maintenance of organized society requires the presence and protection of fire
fighters and police officers," 78 and since society's members are in some sense
helpless to protect themselves against danger of fires and crime, volunteer
firemen who undertake the duty to protect life and property, but abandon
society in its time of need, do leave society in a worsened position and thus
have an affirmative duty to the public. By purporting to be committed mem-
bers of firefighting organizations, firefighters, who might, for example, refuse
to confront a fire, have concealed the need for committed firefighters and
have prevented their organizations from replacing them with diligent
defenders.
In the same manner, the abandonment principle creates a duty of volun-
teer EMS personnel to the public. The existence of this duty demonstrates a
voluntary relationship between an EMT and potential tortfeasing members
75. Several state legislatures have statutorily described the EMT's duty to assist. Ver-
mont has enacted legislation creating a duty to assist for individuals of a certain level of train-
ing whenever they encounter emergency situations and can do so safely. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 519 (1973 & Supp. 1990); cf MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05(1) (West 1988) ("Any person
at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered
grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to
self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.").
76. One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless
adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily
harm caused to him by ... (b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so
doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, at § 324.
77. Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc. 203 Neb. 684, 692, 279 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1979)
(emphasis supplied). The Buchanan court also noted that the fire department itself performs
the public duty and that this duty is one that firemen assume by membership in the organiza-
tion. Id. at 691, 279 N.W.2d at 859. Prosser verifies widespread application of the fireman's
rule to volunteers where the rule is grounded in assumption of risk. See PROSSER, supra note
24, at 431 n.43.
78. Kreski v. Modem Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347, 366, 415 N.W.2d 178,
186 (1987).
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of the public. The comprehensive training of EMS personnel evidences their
awareness of the risks which they may encounter on the job. The existence
of both the voluntary relationship and the awareness of risk establishes pri-
mary assumption of risk on the part of volunteer EMS personnel. Thus,
volunteer EMS should be subject to a fireman's rule based on assumption of
the risk.
Note that the duty owed by volunteer EMS personnel to the public is not,
itself, part of the assumption of risk analysis leading to application of the
fireman's rule, but merely can be used to establish the necessary relationship
between plaintiff and defendant where primary assumption of the risk is as-
serted as a defense. Even if volunteer EMT's and their paramedic counter-
parts had no duty to the public, this deficiency would not preclude
application of the fireman's rule if the requisite relationship could otherwise
be established; under an assumption of the risk analysis, volunteers should
be treated no differently than their paid counterparts.
79
4. Should the Rule Excuse the Duty of the Public?
There is one last question to be resolved before a fireman's rule based upon
primary assumption of the risk might be applied to EMS personnel:
Whether, absent express contract language, the duty of the public to EMS
personnel is excused when EMS personnel agree, as between themselves and
their employer, to assume the risks of hazards incident to their employment?
At least one court has distinguished cases in which the municipal employer
was negligent from those cases in which the negligent defendant was a pri-
vate individual utilizing emergency services: "[Because w]e determined that
the doctrine of assumption of risk ... [is limited to cases] where a master/
servant relationship is involved... [w]e do not believe that the assumption
of the risk can be carried to that extent.""0 It should be noted that this
concern is not widespread and, indeed, Professor Prosser indicates that as-
sumption of the risk is a common basis upon which to adopt the fireman's
rule for firemen in American jurisdictions.8 " Because the fireman's rule pro-
79. Buchanan, 203 Neb. at 692-93, 279 N.W.2d at 861; Moreno v. Marrs, 102 N.M. 373,
377, 695 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Ct. App. 1984).
80. Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 574-75, 694 P.2d 433, 437, 438
(1985). Perhaps more importantly, in Kreski, 151 Mich. App. at 386, 390 N.W.2d at 254, the
seminal Michigan case preceding Kowalski, the court refused to apply an assumption of risk
rationale. The Kreski court analogized the situation of a firefighter to that of a punch-press
operator; the latter arguably assumes the risk of losing a hand while working the press, but
may nonetheless recover tort damages against a third-party tortfeasor. Id. at 386, 390 N.W.2d
at 249. The court found inconsistency in the proposition that firemen might be barred recov-
ery from third-parties. Id.
81. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 430-31 & nn.40-45. "[C]ircumstances that for policy
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tects those whose negligence occasions the summoning of emergency serv-
ices, at least impliedly, the duty of third parties to emergency services
personnel is excused by the assumption of risk doctrine.
One possible explanation for the willingness of courts to excuse the duty
of the public under the fireman's rule is the oft-noted, special relationship of
policemen and firemen to the public. 2 This relationship has historical ori-
gins which may anachronistically constrict application of the fireman's rule.
Policemen, for example, were not traditionally viewed as employees of the
municipality but as extensions of the state, in its most collective sense, with a
duty to protect the public.83 There is a certain unity of view in these cases,
decided as they were in a time when the number of essential public services
was small. Duties of a public nature, namely the protection of life and prop-
erty, were considered public services which could not be arranged by con-
tract between the officer and the municipality."4 In fulfilliig these duties to
protect life and property, officers acted as public servants of the state. While
at the time, courts believed that "this rule [could not] be seriously ques-
tioned,""5 the rule is not currently recognized; policemen and firemen do
reasons are deemed to negate the existence of the usual duty to exercise reasonable care remain
a viable and complete defense .... There can be no question but that [this is so]." Baker v.
Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 710, 719-20, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311, 317 (1982). This statement
is merely a formulation of primary "assumption of risk-a negation of the duty to exercise
reasonable care on the part of the person responsible for the fire." Id.
82. See Kreski, 151 Mich. App. at 366, 415 N.W.2d at 187 (quoting Flowers v. Rock
Creek Terrace, 308 Md. 442, 447, 520 A.2d 361, 367 (1987)).
83. A policeman.., is an arm of the law; he holds an office as a trust from the state;
he is a preserver of the public peace; he is not the hired servant of a master; no
contract relation exists between him and the city by which he is bound to its service;
he can lay down his trust at any time according to his pleasure without exposing
himself to an action for damages for breach of contract.
Farrell v. City of Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191, 195 (1877).
The police officers of a city are not regarded as the servants or agents of the city; their
duties are of a public nature; their appointment is made by the city as a convenient
mode of exercising a function of government; their duties are to preserve the good
order and provide for the safety of the people of the city, and in these duties they act
as the public servants of the state under the law, and not as mere agents of the city.
Hence the relation of principal and agent cannot exist between the city and the police
force ....
Peters v. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654, 656, 20 P. 490, 491 (1889).
The municipal corporation, in these and the like cases represents the state or the
public; the police officers are not servants of the corporation, and hence the principal
of respondeat superior does not apply .... The cases rest on the ground that ...
while engaged in duties related to the public safety, . . . [police officers] are the ser-
vants of the Commonwealth.
Taylor v. City of Owensboro, 98 Ky. 271, 278, 32 S.W. 948, 950 (1895).
84. See Peters, 40 Kan. at 656, 20 P. at 491.
85. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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have a relationship to the municipalities for which they work.
Furthermore, there are now a wide variety of services which are consid-
ered essential in today's society. While it is truly "beyond peradventure that
the maintenance of organized society requires the presence and protection of
fire fighters and police officers," '8 6 EMS personnel should be viewed no dif-
ferently; EMS personnel are every bit as dedicated to the protection and
preservation of life, though the battles they wage are frequently against con-
ditions within the human body and not against external, easily identifiable
threats. The passage of the Florida Emergency Medical Services Grant Act
of 1973, for example, indicates the essential nature of emergency medical
services to the preservation of life.17 In ascertaining whether the fireman's
rule should be extended to EMT's, our modem society should not distin-
guish between members of EMS and firemen on the basis of now inappropri-
ate historical distinctions whose origins in a different historical context are
almost forgotten. 8
B. Extension in Jurisdictions Grounding the Rule in Premises Liability
Before considering whether modem public policy for the fireman's rule
supports an extension of the rule to EMS personnel, it is useful to examine
policy based upon traditional premises liability and to examine the general
outlook of this policy on the duty owed to EMS personnel. Firemen and
policemen have traditionally been considered licensees because a landowner
cannot reasonably be expected to prepare for the visit of a fireman or a po-
liceman-such a person may enter at will in performance of his public duty
and is likely to enter at unforeseen times and upon unusual parts of the
property.8 9
A landowner is no more able to prepare for the visit of an EMT than he is
able to prepare for a fireman or a policeman. By virtue of the state police
power, a fireman or policeman may enter onto land, before a landowner can
make it safe, in order to protect the public. 90 EMS personnel do not have
this power but may, however, enter without the consent of the landowner
86. Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply, 429 Mich. 347, 366, 415 N.W.2d 178, 186
(1987).
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 401.104 (West 1986).
88. Actually, a "high quality emergency service has become an expected government
function, the 'third public force' after fire and police protection." Glastris, supra note 3, at 19.
89. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 61.
90. While a fireman, as a private individual, may enter in order to avert public calamity or
disaster, see HARPER, supra note 27, at § 1.16; American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L.
590, 599-602 (1851), he will ordinarily enter under authority of law-"under governmental
authority to serve a public purpose." Flowers v. Sting Sec., Inc., 62 Md. App. 116, 126, 488
A.2d 523, 528, aff'd, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
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under the common law doctrine of private necessity. 9' Additionally, EMS
personnel may enter without consent when charged with a certain duty and
given authority by statute for the performance of acts necessitating entry
onto private premises. 92 "In all such cases the duty or authority carries with
it a privilege to enter private land .... ,,93 In practice, EMS personnel fre-
quently enter land with the specific authorization of a policeman or fireman
who requires the presence of EMS personnel in order to fulfill that public
safety officer's duty to protect life and property.9 4 Furthermore, regarding
the unfairness of insisting that landowners keep their premises safe for the
largely unpredictable appearances of firemen and policemen, EMT's, be-
cause of their role in the EMS system, are equally likely to appear at unlikely
times and in unlikely places; in many cases, the landowner will not be pres-
ent either to forbid access or to make the land safe. Finally, whereas a fire-
man may be somewhat like a business invitee in that prevention of damage
conveys pecuniary, business-related benefits to the landowner,95 no such
benefits are conveyed by EMS personnel. Thus, EMT's should be consid-
ered licensees to the same extent as firemen, and jurisdictions grounding the
fireman's rule in traditional premises liability rule should extend the rule to
EMS personnel. 96
91. HARPER, supra note 27, at § 1.22 (privilege to intrude where intrusion is necessary, or
reasonably appears to be necessary, to save life or property of greater value than the harm
caused by the intrusion); see also Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of
Interests of Property and Personalty, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307, 314 (1926) ("An act intended to
invade another's legally protected interests is privileged only if done to protect or advance
some public interest or an interest of the actor.").
92. HARPER, supra note 27, at § 1.20.
93. Id.
94. Telephone interview with Teresa Jenkens, Counsel for District of Columbia Fire De-
partment (Oct. 1989). While in People v. Olsen, 186 Cal. App. 3d 257, 230 Cal. Rptr. 598
(1986), private paramedics did not come within the definition of either "emergency rescue
personnel" or "public officer" in the penal statute prohibiting interference with the lawful
efforts of such individuals, and thus had no police power, id. at 263, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 601,
most EMT's are also firemen and under this statute would be granted police power over civil-
ians while in performance of their official duties. Where EMT's have some form of police
power, a landowner frequently will not be able to predict the appearance of EMT's on his
property. Moreover, like firemen and policemen, EMT's exercise this power in unlikely times
and places. It is therefore inconsistent to afford EMT's the higher protection afforded invitees
while categorizing firemen and policemen as licensees only.
95. See supra note 27.
96. Brady v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 35 Ohio St. 3d 161, 519 N.E.2d 387 (1988), creates
a logical exemption to a fireman's rule based in premises liability, an exemption which should
apply with equal force to a fireman's rule extended to EMS personnel. This case holds that
"where a policeman enters into an area.., held open for the use of the general public, where it
is reasonable for the landowner to expect police presence and prepare for it, the police officer
stands in the same position as others being an invitee." Id. at 163, 519 N.E.2d at 389.
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C Extension in Jurisdictions Grounding the Rule
in Public Policy Rationales
Lastly, the question of whether the fireman's rule should be applied to
EMS personnel must be considered in light of public policy concerns that
have led to the adoption of the fireman's rule in many states. Public policy
provides important rationales for the fireman's rule. 97 Because, however,
courts are only now beginning to consider the extension of the fireman's rule
to EMS personnel, they have yet to articulate policies, supporting the exten-
sion of the rule, similar to those supporting the existence of the rule gener-
ally.9" If, however, a goal is the continued existence and development of
EMS systems, extension of the rule to EMS personnel would be offensive to
this policy only if it negatively impacted the growth of the necessary and
essential services provided by EMS personnel.99 At this time, there is no
empirical authority for the proposition that the adoption of the fireman's
rule would have a detrimental impact on the growth of the EMS profession.
Although courts have yet to consider policy rationales favoring extension
of the fireman's rule to EMS personnel, the policy concerns that support the
rule generally also support its extension to EMS personnel. At least one
court has stated that "[flirefighters are present... not because of any private
duty owed the occupant, but because of the duty owed to the public as a
whole.''  In this regard, EMS personnel are no different from firemen.
They owe no private duty to any person, but operate to save lives because of
a public duty to assist individuals requiring emergency and sometimes non-
emergency medical attention.
Secondly, courts have indicated that the stated purpose of the fireman's
and policeman's profession is to protect the public. This " 'distinguishes
safety officers from other employees.' "' The job of the EMT and others in
the EMS system is also to protect the public, albeit from the future medical
consequences of events often caused by the negligence of individuals. More-
over, while safety officers confront dangers hazardous to their health as the
object of their duty and EMS personnel only largely confront dangers in a
peripheral fashion, it may be argued that this is not grounds to prevent ex-
tension of the rule to EMT's. When the EMT or his paramedic counterpart
97. See Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 576, 694 P.2d 433, 438 (1985).
98. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 401.104 (West 1988).
100. Kowalski v. Gratopp, 177 Mich. App. 448, 450, 442 N.W.2d 682, 683 (1989) (quoting
Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347, 366, 415 N.W.2d 178, 186-187
(1987)).
101. Id. at 451, 442 N.W.2d at 683-84 (quoting Kreski, 429 Mich. at 367, 415 N.W.2d at
187).
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becomes a member of EMS, he or she assumes the risk of dangers incidental
to the provision of emergency medical services in the same way that firemen
may be said to assume the risk of dangers which are directly the subject of
their duty.10 2 As a further consideration, fairness dictates that firemen have
licensee status because landowners cannot predict the appearance of firemen.
Owners and occupiers can predict the visits of EMS personnel with no more
success than they can predict the visits of other safety officers. EMS person-
nel cannot be separated from firemen and policemen on the basis of the na-
ture of their respective jobs; although they can be separated by lack of a
static duty to risk their lives, examination of the multiple bases for the fire-
man's rule indicates that the existence of this duty has never been relevant to
the adoption of the fireman's rule.
Another public policy rationale basic to the fireman's rule has been "the
spreading to the public of the costs of employing safety officers and of com-
pensating them for any injuries they may sustain in the course of their em-
ployment. "103 Like the cost of injuries to firemen, the costs of injuries to
EMT's may be spread onto the public. Injuries suffered by EMS personnel
could be made compensable by existing worker's compensation plans. In
some respects, legislatures have already done this. Florida, for example, has
granted both firemen and EMS personnel worker's compensation for up to
100% of the salary lost while injured, and the right to benefit from munici-
pality-funded group health insurance policies. " As a whole, legislatures
have not, however, implemented compensation packages for EMS personnel
as comprehensive as those provided for firemen.'0 5 Certainly, this reflects
the need to educate not only the courts but also the legislatures as to the
existence of the significant hazards that EMS personnel confront.
III. THE COURTS CONSIDER A FIREMAN'S RULE APPLIED TO EMT's
Kowalski v. Gratopp,'°6 decided in June 1989, is the first decision to con-
102. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
103. Kowalski, 177 Mich. App. at 450, 442 N.W.2d at 683.
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.08 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
105. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.18, .19, .191, 121.0515 (West 1982). The Florida
legislature has given firemen additional compensation in the form of accidental death benefits,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.191 (West 1982), special disability benefits, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 112.18, .19 (West 1988), and more retirement pension credit per year than other public em-
ployees because of the arduous nature of the job. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 121.0515(1) (West
1982).
Benefit protection to volunteer emergency services personnel tends to be even less than that
of their paid counterparts, although volunteers are usually covered by workmen's compensa-
tion plans. See Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 692, 279 N.W.2d 855, 860
(1979).
106. 117 Mich. App. 448, 442 N.W.2d 682 (1989).
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sider the application of the fireman's rule to paramedics acting in their ca-
pacity as EMS personnel.'° 7 Prior to this decision, all EMS personnel, who
were also firemen and were attempting to recover for injuries occasioned by
the negligence necessitating their presence, were barred from such recovery
by their membership in a fire service.'0o In Kowalski, the plaintiff paramedic
worked for Community Emergency Medical Services. Plaintiff's employer
operated under a contract with the City of Pontiac for ambulance service.'o 9
Responding to a call from the fire department to pick up a nonemergency
patient who was suffering abdominal pain, Kowalski arrived at the scene,
slipped on an icy walkway, and tore a tendon in his right bicep. He later
filed suit alleging negligent maintenance of the premises. ' ° Defendant
moved for summary judgment under the fireman's rule."'
The court refused to apply the fireman's rule to Kowalski, holding that
the fireman's rule by its very nature is limited to public employees.112 Public
107. Because of the increasing sophistication of emergency medical care, many states have
distinguished categories of EMS personnel according to skill level. For example, the Florida
legislature has defined two classes of EMS personnel-EMT's and paramedics: "'Emergency
medical technician' or 'EMT' means any person who is trained in basic life support and who is
certified by the department to perform such procedures in emergency situations." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 401.23(12) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990). "'Basic life support' means treatment of medi-
cal emergencies by a qualified person through the use of techniques such as patient assessment,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), splinting, obstetrical assistance, bandaging, administra-
tion of oxygen, application of medical anti-shock trousers, and other techniques ...." Id. at
§ 401.23(8). " 'Paramedic' means a person who is certified by the department to perform basic
and advanced life support, pursuant to the provisions of this act." Id. at § 401.23(18). " 'Ad-
vanced life support' means treatment of life-threatening medical emergencies through the use
of techniques such as endotracheal intubation, the administration of drugs or intravenous
fluids, telemetry, cardiac monitoring, and cardiac defibrillation by a qualified person, pursuant
to rules of the department." Id. at § 401.23(1).
108. See, e.g., Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 694 P.2d 433 (1985). Cal-
vert was a captain with the Great Bend Fire Department and was responsible for both firefight-
ing and rescue work. He was dispatched to the scene of an anhydrous ammonia leak. On this
run, he was in charge of the ambulance and was thus called upon to make use of his training as
a licensed EMT. Having retrieved a downed man from the vapor area, Calvert was exposed to
the ammonia cloud and was injured. The court held that a firefighter (the court did not con-
sider Calvert as an EMT) could not recover for injuries caused by the very wrong that required
his presence in an official capacity and subjected the firefighter to harm. Id. at 570, 694 P.2d at
435-36, 438.
109. Kowalski v. Gratopp, 177 Mich. App. 448, 449, 442 N.W.2d 682, 683 (1989).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The court reasoned that, in this situation, the plaintiff had not been acting as a
public employee. The Community Emergency Medical Services (Community), the plaintiff's
employer, was a private company under contract with the city for emergency medical services.
This service was limited in scope. The pleadings indicate that Community billed the patient
directly for nonemergency calls as opposed to billing the city. According to the plaintiff, the
particular call on which he was injured was not an emergency. The court of appeals held the
evidence of plaintiff's private employment sufficient to reverse the lower court's grant of the
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employees, stated the court, are the ones paid and trained by public funds;,113
the fireman's rule prevents this group of people from being doubly compen-
sated by members of the public through private litigation. In dicta, the court
stated that had the plaintiff been viewed as a public employee, the fireman's
rule still would not apply insofar as the Michigan Supreme Court did not
contemplate the extension of the fireman's rule beyond firefighters and po-
lice." 4 The court reasoned that "[s]afety officers are employed, specially
trained, and paid to confront dangerous situations for the protection of soci-
ety. They enter their professions with the certain knowledge that their per-
sonal safety is at risk while on duty.""' 5
Given the public policy rationale behind the Michigan fireman's rule, the
Kowalski holding appears unassailable: the Michigan fireman's rule is lim-
ited to public employees on the grounds that firemen protect the public and
should be compensated, collectively, by the same;" 6 Kowalski was not act-
ing as a public employee when he was injured."
17
It is the dicta of the Kowalski court, however, that may be misguided and
which certainly focuses on that area of law most in need of development.
Given the foregoing analysis, it appears that the fireman's rule should be
applied to EMS personnel who are public employees. The greatest hurdle to
this application, and the greatest dissimilarity between firemen and EMS
personnel, appears to be that firemen are paid to confront dangers inherent
in firefighting, such as smoke and flames,"' while EMT's confront these
dangers only incidentally to the performance of their duties. Two factors
nullify the importance of this difference. First, there are a host of hazards
which are no more likely to be encountered by firemen than by EMS person-
nel. In one case, for example, a plaintiff firefighter arrived at the scene to
defendant's motion for summary judgment, where the court of appeals interpreted the fire-
man's rule as only limiting recovery of public employees. Id. at 450-51, 442 N.W.2d at 683.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 451, 442 N.W.2d at 683.
115. Id. at 451, 442 N.W.2d at 684 (quoting Kreski v. Modem Wholesale Elec. Supply Co.,
429 Mich. 347, 371-72, 415 N.W.2d 178, 189 (1987)).
116. Id. at 450, 442 N.W.2d at 683.
117. Id. The record before the court of appeals reflected the fact that Kowalski was injured
while on a nonemergency call. Id. Although some state statutes indicate that EMS is to be
funded to assist both medical emergencies and non-emergencies, such is not the case with the
Michigan EMS enabling statute. MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 333.3203, .20703(1), (4), .20760
(1980 & Supp. 1990). Plaintiff's bifurcated billing policy-billing the municipality for emer-
gency calls and the plaintiff in nonemergency situations, Kowalski v. Gratopp, 177 Mich. App.
448, 450, 442 N.W.2d 682, 683 (1989)-reflects the fiscal demarcation between public and
nonpublic duties. In servicing a non-emergency call, the plaintiff paramedic was not acting in
his capacity as a public employee.
118. See Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 371, 644 P.2d 822, 828, 182 Cal. Rptr.
629, 634-35 (1982).
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assist the defendant who had fallen from her walker inside the house and
required emergency medical attention. When the firefighter determined that
materials were needed from the ambulance, he exited the house and slipped
on ice." 9 The judge determined that weather was one of the inherent risks
of a firefighter's calling.' 2 ° He then applied the fireman's rule despite the
fact that ice is clearly not a danger from which firemen are hired to protect
the public. Weather and hazardous conditions in the terrain are, equally,
risks inherent in the calling of EMT's and their paramedic counterparts.
Even if "firemanly" hazards such as smoke and falling buildings are to be
viewed as outside the scope of an EMT's employment, this should not pre-
clude application of the fireman's rule to all hazards encountered by EMS
personnel.
Secondly, there exist hazards unique to EMS which compel extension of
the fireman's rule because they are incidental to the profession. Consider the
hypothetical in which an EMT responds to a call where the victim has been
exposed to a laboratory virus negligently released into the work place and
during which the EMT is, himself, exposed to the virus. All of the rationales
for the adoption of the fireman's rule are available in this instance. An EMT
arguably assumes the risk that, upon employment, he will be exposed to a
variety of diseases in the course of his employment. Further, if he is a public
employee, his salary and workman's compensation will be funded in part by
the very taxpayer whose negligence occasioned the presence of EMS. And
finally, under the common law doctrine of private necessity, the EMT may
enter the laboratory without the consent of the owner or occupier of the
laboratory and thus the owner may not bar the EMT while the premises are
made safe.
In order to protect the individual victim and society in general from the
future consequences of the disease, it is absolutely necessary for the EMT to
confront the victim and hence the virus. There is no salient dissimilarity
between this situation and that of a fireman fighting a fire.' 21 The question
that should now concern the courts is not whether the fireman's rule should
be blanketly applied to EMS personnel, but whether, in a specific factual
119. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Heiot, 224 N.J. Super. 441, 443, 540 A.2d 920, 921 (Law
Div. 1988).
120. Id. at 444-45, 450 A.2d at 922.
121. Where a reasonable EMT would not expose himself to the virus, the particular EMT
has no duty to do so. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. His discretionary ability
to avoid exposure is irrelevant to the question of whether the fireman's rule should be extended
to EMS personnel: if he does not confront the virus, he will simply not be harmed and, without
injury, will file no suit; if he does confront the virus, he does so having assumed a public duty
to provide emergency medical care where reasonable-the fireman's rule merely assures that
the public, not a private individual, will compensate him for his injury.
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situation, the hazard confronted is within the scope of the plaintiff's
employment.
A second EMS case, Siligato v. Hiles, 22 considered application of the fire-
man's rule to EMS personnel. Recognizing that the risk of injury is inherent
in the work performed by EMS personnel, the court in Siligato held that
"the application of the 'fireman's rule' is extended to volunteer emergency
rescue squad workers." 12 3 In Siligato, an EMT responded to an emergency
call and was forced to witness the death of his own nineteen-month-old
baby. 124 He sued under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.' 25 The court held that the risk of witnessing the death of one's child
was a risk assumed by EMS personnel and barred recovery on account of the
fireman's rule.1 26 This unlikely result, in the only case to have considered
risks inherent in the EMS profession, highlights the need for development in
this area of the law. While it appears likely that risks due to weather and
dangerous terrain are risks assumed by EMS personnel, the extent to which
"firemanly" risks, risk of exposure to the AIDS virus (where for instance the
victim negligently fails to inform EMS of his infection), and the risk of other
injuries are assumed by EMT's and their paramedic counterparts, has yet to
be decided. As the organization of EMS systems and the training of EMS
personnel evolve, the line separating hazards inside and outside the scope of
the job will change. Given the rapid pace of development in potential EMS
capabilities and the relative newness of the field, it is likely that solutions
offered by today's courts will not suffice in the future.
CONCLUSION
The fireman's rule is supported by a loosely-woven collection of common
law and policy justifications. The use of these rationales to justify applica-
tion of the fireman's rule to EMS personnel highlights the similarity between
EMT's and firemen. EMS personnel, like firemen, are paid to assist in emer-
gency situations which may be, and frequently are, produced by the negli-
gence of others. Further, many risks involved in this public service are
clearly delineated at every step of the training process of emergency medical
personnel and are therefore inherent in the job. Such risks can be readily
compensated by salary considerations and benefits. Because these compen-
sations are paid by the taxpayer, it appears unjust to allow EMS personnel to
hold the taxpayer liable for negligence in creating risks that are an identifi-
122. 236 N.J. Super. 64, 563 A.2d 1172 (Law Div. 1989).
123. Id. at 67, 563 A.2d at 1173.
124. Id. at 64, 563 A.2d at 1172.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 68, 563 A.2d at 1174.
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able part of the job of an EMS member. Barring any indication that the
application of the fireman's rule to EMS personnel has an adverse effect on
the stated policy of promoting the growth of this essential and necessary
service, the fireman's rule should apply to EMS personnel.
Ideally, courts will continue to make use of informed commentary on the
emergency medical services profession in order to identify accurately those
risks which are in fact an inherent part of this profession. Likewise, legisla-
tures should keep abreast of the developments in the field of emergency med-
ical care so that funding for training, equipment, and compensation will
continue to reflect the role of EMS in today's society.
Stephen E. Ruscus

